Abstract
During the larger conflict of the American Civil War was a less known (or cared about) war fought between whites and Indians on the "Frontier." Particular to Colorado (and the western plains of Kansas) was the Cheyenne War, fought between (obviously) the Cheyenne and whites (in the form of Union troops). Regardless of perspective, the events at Sand Creek, Colorado on November 29, 1864 best exemplify this friction. What is undisputable is this: Colorado troops, under the command of Colonel John M. Chivington marched from Denver to Sand Creek and attacked the Cheyenne and Arapahoe encamped there. This paper argues Colonel Chivington operated within established policies and directives of war declared by both the governor of the Colorado Territory, John Evans, and his tactical commander, Major General Samuel Ryan Curtis. The systemic strategic scapegoating of superiors and developed dissent of subordinates changed the face of the legitimate military operation at Sand Creek forever to what became widely known as the Sand Creek Massacre.