

Cracking the Conclave Code: Unraveling the Mysteries of Papal Elections

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As the leader of the world's Catholics, the pope is one of the most powerful men in the world. However, the conclaves in which popes are elected remain poorly understood by the general public and the political science community. Hence, most attempts to predict their outcomes fail. This paper identifies key dynamics of these elections in order to make it possible to predict their results. A historical analysis of recent conclaves is used to determine whether conclaves produce results according to discernable patterns, and an in-depth analysis of the 2005 conclave will reveal the political dynamics within the College of Cardinals. Results indicate that it is possible to make several concrete predictions about the outcomes of future conclaves. While it may be impossible to determine the next pope's exact identity, this study shows that it may be possible to determine his age, region of origin, and ideology.

The date is July 17th, 2013, and the world is about to be shocked. It has been two weeks since the death of Pope Benedict XVI, and the cardinals of the Catholic Church have spent three days engaged in a conclave to elect his successor. The white smoke announcing the election of a pope billows out of the chimney of the Sistine Chapel, followed a half hour later by the announcement that Cardinal Telesphore Toppo of India has just been elected as Pope Leo XIV. The “expert” analysts on CNN are dumbfounded and speechless. None of them had thought that Toppo would receive votes, let alone become pope.

Despite the fact that this scenario is fictional, it is not totally without grounding in reality. The results of papal conclaves are notoriously hard to predict, often electing unknown cardinals who were not even thought to be contenders. However, this thesis postulates that outcomes of such conclaves can indeed be explained and even predicted. Ultimately, the goal is to define a cohesive rubric which may be used to analyze and possibly even predict the outcome of future

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conclaves. The study includes a comparative analysis of a number of recent conclaves (primarily those in the 20th Century), as well as an analysis of the politics among the current cardinals.

The paper begins by establishing the details of the election process, the outcomes of the most recent elections, and the specific dynamics of how those results arose. Reviewing this history reveals patterns quirks which must be taken into account in building profiles of future conclaves. Special attention is given to the conclave of 2005, the most recent election. This serves the important purpose of examining the specific dynamics and composition of the College of Cardinals which will elect the next pontiff, as Pope Benedict XVI's age makes it likely that cardinals who voted in 2005 will form the majority of the electorate at the next conclave. This analysis will identify broad ideological groupings that exist and the cardinals who have shown the ability to act as leaders among those groups.

The paper concludes by looking ahead to the conclave that will select Benedict XVI's successor. While it is impossible to say exactly who will be elected, it is possible to discern which factions of cardinals have the potential to elect a pope, which factions do not, and what key characteristics a cardinal must possess in order to be elected. This will eliminate large numbers of cardinals from papal speculation and winnow the list of potential popes from 121 cardinals to a few dozen names. The resulting list is not as short as those produced by the punditry, but it is more academically based. The conclusions of this thesis cannot name the next pope, but they should provide useful tools for those who wish to attempt such predictions.

What is a Conclave, and Why is it so Difficult to Predict?

The conclave is a rather unique electoral system, so it is necessary to explain the process itself before delving into the results it produces. Popes are elected by the College of Cardinals via secret ballot, and a candidate must receive two thirds of the votes cast in order to be elected. If a ballot fails to produce a pope, it will be followed by successive ballots until a candidate reaches the two-thirds threshold. Four ballots are held every day, two in the morning and two in the afternoon; the exception being the first day, when only one ballot is conducted. Cardinals are banned from discussing the proceedings both before and after the election, and the ballots are burned (Allen, 2002, pp.110-113), this makes it hard to obtain historical data.¹

Two distinguishing features of the process are the supermajority required for victory and the fact that candidates are not officially eliminated in any way. This can (and has) led to situations where a cardinal has won a majority of the votes, but lost the election as a result of a strong opposing minority. Another possibility is that a candidate who has drawn little or no support on early ballots could eventually gather support on later ballots.

Colomer and McLean (1998) assert that the two-thirds rule makes papal conclaves invulnerable to "disequilibrium or cycles" (p.10). According to these two scholars, "when more voters prefer intermediate candidates than the average of those favoring extremes, an unbeatable proposal exists, and no cycles are possible." (p. 10) Three 20th Century conclaves appear to prove this point. The compromise choices of Popes Pius XI, John Paul I, and John Paul II emerged from conclaves marred by bitter ideological divides, denying a clear victory to any faction.

¹ For a more detailed description of the conclave process, see Chapter 3 of John Allen's 2002 book *Conclave: The Politics, Personalities, and Process of the Next Papal Election*, which outlines the entire process from the death of a Pope until the installation mass of his successor.

However, two important caveats must be added to Colomer and McLean's analysis. First, the "number of voters preferring an intermediate option" may not always be "greater than the average of those favoring extremes". Indeed, several 20th century conclaves have been decided in massive landslides, a dynamic that could lead to the election of an "extreme option". Second, Colomer and McLean state that the system's resistance to cycles is only valid for elections with up to three candidates (p. 10), and it is possible for more than three candidates to emerge at a conclave.

Several books on papal succession were published in the years leading up to the death of John Paul II, as the pope's health was obviously declining and a conclave seemed to be quickly approaching. These works constructed thoughtful and detailed analyses of the dynamics within the College of Cardinals at the time, yet the lists of *papabili* (papal candidates) that they generated tended not to identify Joseph Ratzinger as a major contender.

John Peter Pham's 2004 book *Heirs of the Fisherman* put forward a list of five candidates: Dionigi Tettamanzi, Archbishop of Milan; Severino Polletto, Archbishop of Turin; Angelo Scola, Patriarch of Venice; Francis Arize, Prefect of the Congregation of for Divine Worship; and Christoph Schönborn, the Archbishop of Vienna (pp. 153-156). The oldest of these candidates (Arinze) was 5 years younger than Ratzinger ("The College of Cardinals: Biographical Notes", 2008), and all but one of them (also Arinze) were diocesan Archbishops, whereas Ratzinger was a longtime Vatican official ("The College of Cardinals: Biographical Notes"). The unique thing about Pham's work was that he also included a list of nine potential "grand electors", or kingmakers, which *did* include Joseph Ratzinger (Pham, 2004, pp. 144-145). So, while he recognized Ratzinger's power in the college, Pham failed to see whatever dynamic(s) led to his election. In fact, he may have predicted the exact opposite of the actual result, as some accounts list Schönborn as one of the key engineers of Ratzinger's election (Allen, 2005, p.123). Schönborn, the supposed *papabile* turned out to be a "grand elector", while Ratzinger, the supposed "grand elector", was the leading *papabile*.

Probably the most careful predictions were done by journalist John Allen, Jr. of the *National Catholic Reporter* in his 2002 work *Conclave: The Personalities and Process of the Next Papal Election*. Putting forth a rather long list of 20 *papabili*, Allen said "I believe the odds are very strong that the new pope will be one of the twenty men listed here." Joseph Ratzinger was left off the list. The future Benedict XVI did make Allen's top 25 in the 2004 revised and updated edition of *Conclave*. However, the second edition divided the 25 contenders into two sections, a top ten list and second tier, including Ratzinger, entitled "fifteen to watch" (pp.163-186) (p.182). So, while Allen was closer to the mark in 2004 than 2002, he still failed to see Joseph Ratzinger for what he was: the prohibitive frontrunner in the race to succeed John Paul II.

Historical Analysis of the Last Nine Elections

So, what did the "experts" miss? Part of the puzzle is solved by a historical analysis of recent conclaves, which reveals several clear-cut patterns. For the purposes of this study, the sample is limited to the nine conclaves which have taken place since the turn of the twentieth century; the narrowing the focus to include only elections that took place under somewhat modern conditions.

The papacy's temporal sovereignty was lost in 1870, under Pius IX. That year Italian forces under Victor Emmanuel occupied Rome and the city was incorporated into the Italian state (McBrien, 1997, p. 345), leaving Papacy as a purely spiritual office. This makes it possible

to consider the 1878 election of Leo XIII in a study of modern conclaves. However, little has been written on that particular conclave. It is also possible to argue that the 1903 election of Pius X marked the full transition to the modern papacy as the cardinals elected a man who was born a commoner rather than a nobleman (McBrien, 1997, p.352). One could also make arguments for a smaller sample size based on the changing role of the papacy or shifts in the size and national origin of the College of Cardinals. However, including all nine 20th century conclaves allows a sample size (9 conclaves) large enough to clearly show the difference between genuine patterns and fluke occurrences.

Cases

The first conclave analyzed is the 1903 election after the death of Leo XIII, who reigned for 26 years before dying at age 93 (Pham, 2004, p. 188). The early frontrunner was Leo's Secretary of State, Cardinal Mariano Rampolla del Tindaro (Pham, 2004, p. 100). However, despite overcoming an attempt by the Emperor of Austria to use an ancient right of veto, Rampolla's candidacy peaked at roughly 30 votes on the fourth ballot, short of the 42 needed to win. However, another candidate had been steadily gaining votes: the patriarch of Venice, Cardinal Giuseppe Sarto. Wresting the lead from Rampolla on the fifth ballot, Sarto went on to be elected as Pope Pius X on the seventh ballot. The cardinals had shunned the early favorite and instead elected the 68 year old son of a postman (McBrien, 1997, p. 352).

Pius X held the papacy until 1914, passing away within a month of the beginning of World War I (Pham, 2004, p. 103). The reign of Pius was marked a by a crusade against modernism, including investigations of priests and the establishment of a network of secret informers within the church. Even anti-modernist cardinals saw this as overkill, and the conclave was their opportunity to steer the church in a different direction (Pham, 2004, p. 105). The first ballot produced a tie between two men who had not been on good terms with Pius: Archbishop of Pisa Pietro Maffi, who had been investigated for being a scientist in addition to a clergyman; and Cardinal Giacomo della Chiesa, a protégé of Rampolla who had been made Archbishop of Bologna as a way of "exiling" him from his Vatican position.

Both candidates increased their vote count through the conclave's first day, with della Chiesa holding the lead. The second day saw an effort by the hard-line supporters of Pius X to put forward the name of Cardinal Domenico Serafini, who attracted the votes of most of the Maffi supporters. However, della Chiesa continued to gain votes and was elected on the second ballot of the third day (10th overall), taking the name Benedict XV (Pham, 2004, p. 106). While the cardinals had chosen a new direction for the church, it is hard to call the election of 60 year-old della Chiesa a surprise.

Unfortunately, Benedict XV died an early death from pneumonia at the age of 67, forcing the cardinals to elect his successor earlier than expected. According to John Peter Pham, four cardinals were seen as *papabili* going into the conclave of 1922: Pietro Maffi of Pisa; Rafael Merry del Val, Pius X's Secretary of State; Pietro Gasparri, Benedict XV's Secretary of State; and Pietro La Fontaine, Patriarch of Venice (Pham 107-108). Indeed, it seems that all four received votes on the first ballot – Pham sets the total at Merry del Val 12, Maffi 10, Gasparri 8, La Fontaine 4. However, the unknown Achille Ratti, who had been a cardinal for only one year, also received five votes. Both Merry del Val and Gasparri gained support throughout the first day of voting, while Maffi and Ratti held steady at 10 and 5 votes, respectively. However, the situation changed on the second day. Merry del Val's supporters moved their support to the less controversial La Fontaine, who saw his total rise to 21 votes by the end of the day (while Merry del Val's vote eventually fell to zero). Maffi also lost all of his support, leaving the conclave

deadlocked between La Fontaine and Gasparri. The first two ballots of the second day produced little change but saw some votes shift to Ratti, but the first afternoon ballot saw Gasparri's supporters shift en masse to Ratti, giving him a slim lead over La Fontaine. This proved to be the decisive turning point, and Ratti was elected the next morning, taking the name Pius XI (Pham, 2004, p. 109). The cardinals had shocked the world yet again by rejecting the supposed frontrunners and electing a 64 year-old unknown as a compromise choice.

Pius XI served until 1939, and the conclave following his death proved to be one of the shortest and most anti-climactic in recent history. The Vatican's secretary of state, Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli, entered the conclave as the unquestioned favorite. He even seemed to have the endorsement of the deceased pontiff, who said of him in 1937, "He'll make a good pope!" (Pham 112). The conclave required only three ballots to elect Pacelli, a 63 year old career diplomat from Rome, as Pope Pius XII. (Pham, 2004, pp. 114-155)

Pacelli enjoyed a long reign. He passed in 1958 after 19 years on the throne (Pham, 2004, p.115), leaving no clear successor. The man many thought he had been grooming for the job, Giovanni Battista Montini, had been "exiled" from his position in the curia and made Archbishop of Milan without receiving the red hat usually associated with that position (Pham, 2004, p. 118). The pre-election frontrunners included Giuseppe Siri, the 52 year-old Archbishop of Genoa; Alfredo Ottaviani, Pro-Secretary of the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office; Grégoire-Pierre XV Agagianian, Patriarch of the Armenian Rite Catholic Church, and Giacomo Lercaro, Archbishop of Bologna. (Elliott, 1973, p. 6) However, there was little consensus as to what direction the church should take, and a long election was expected. Cardinal Gaetano Cicognani went so far as to say that the process would take "a long time" (Pham, 2004, p. 118). 1958 also marked the end of Italian dominance, as Pius XII had internationalized the college to the point where Italians held only 17 of the world's 51 red skullcaps. This presented the possibility of a far more open field of candidates than in previous elections. (Pham, 2004, p. 117)

The first ballot showed two clear leaders, as it seems that roughly 20 votes each were received by Agagianian and Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, the 76 year-old Patriarch of Venice. Agagianian's candidacy stalled at the end of the first day, and the later-to-emerge candidacy of Benedetto Aloisi Masella also floundered (Pham, 2004, p.119- 120). Meanwhile, Roncalli moved steadily toward the 38 votes needed for a two-thirds majority and was elected as Pope John XXIII on the eleventh ballot. The cardinals had again selected a candidate who almost never appeared in lists of *papabili* (Elliott, 1973, p.8), this time an aging former diplomat.

Anyone who hoped that John XXIII would be a transitional figure was sorely disappointed by his five-year reign, during which he convened the Second Vatican Council (Allen, 2002, p.39). John also left behind an expanded college of 82 cardinals, 80 of whom made it to the 1963 conclave. As had Pius XI, John had dropped a few subtle hints about who his successor should be, fingering the Archbishop of Milan, Giovanni Battista Montini. Having been denied cardinalship under Pius XII, Montini received it in short order under John. In fact, the Pope was even said to have told Montini, "If you had received your red hat when you should have, I would not be here." (Pham, 2004, p. 121) Still, the first ballot seemed to indicate a relatively close race, with Montini receiving some 30 votes while about 20 votes each went to the Archbishop of Bologna, Cardinal Giacomo Lercaro, and the former papal nuncio to Spain, Cardinal Ildebrando Antoniutti. The second ballot produced a similar result, generating fears of gridlock. The third ballot gave Montini 50 votes (58 were needed to elect), but roughly 30 conservative cardinals were still voting for Antoniutti or other conservatives. Montini was said to have almost

withdrawn his candidacy to prevent division, but was persuaded not to. He was elected Pope Paul VI on the sixth ballot (Pham, 2004, pp.120-122). So, while there was drama in the Sistine Chapel, the papacy eventually went to the man who had been the favorite all along.

The number of cardinals continued to swell under Pope Paul, growing to 129 by the time of his death in 1978 (Pham, 2004, p.124). However, Paul also instituted a rule excluding cardinals over age 80 from conclaves (Pham, 2004, p.341). So, only 111 men participated in the election. The first ballot gave 25 votes to Giuseppe Siri, the arch-conservative Archbishop of Genoa. Close behind was the unknown Patriarch of Venice, Albino Luciani. Fearing a Siri papacy, the college's progressive faction decided during that day's lunch break to throw their votes to Luciani. The third ballot saw Luciani receive 70 votes, just shy of the needed 75, and he was swept into the papacy on the fourth ballot as Pope John Paul I. (Pham, 2004, pp.124-128) Luciani, who had not appeared in any pre-conclave predictions, was most certainly a surprise.

Tragically, John Paul I died after only 33 days as pope, forcing the cardinals to reconvene. Two favorites emerged: Siri, the hero of the conservatives; and the 57 year-old standard-bearer of the progressives, Florence Archbishop Giovanni Benelli. Indeed, the first ballot showed the two men deadlocked, receiving roughly 30 votes each. Benelli is said to have nearly doubled his total on the second ballot, only to fall back to 42 votes on the third. Siri held steady on the second ballot, but shot up to 60 votes on the third and 70 on the fourth, coming within five votes of election. Siri seemed certain to be elected on the next ballot (Pham, 2004, p.131), but the fifth ballot actually saw him lose support while several minor candidates picked up votes. One of these was the Archbishop of Krakow, Karol Wojtyła, who received a total of 11 votes. During the lunch break, Wojtyła's candidacy was promoted to non-Italian Cardinals by the powerful Cardinal Franz König of Austria, the engineer of the Wojtyła candidacy, with the aid of Philadelphia's Polish-American Cardinal, John Krol. It worked brilliantly, as Wojtyła is reported to have surged to between 47 and 73 votes on the seventh ballot. On the eighth ballot, he was elected in a landslide (Pham, 2004, p.132), becoming the first non-Italian pope since the 16th century and the first Polish pope ever (Pham, 2004, p.129). Wojtyła's election was unexpected simply because he was not seen as a favorite before the conclave, but it was his nationality that made him one of the biggest surprises in papal history. Taking the name John Paul II, Wojtyła embarked on a storied 26-year reign.

The cardinals would not convene again until 2005, when they elected Joseph Ratzinger as Benedict XVI. As the conclave occurred so recently, a clear picture has yet to emerge of exactly what happened during the course of the election. The few details that have emerged are probably best recounted by John Allen, Jr. in his 2005 book, *The Rise of Benedict XVI*. According to Allen, several cardinals confirmed that the first ballot gave roughly 40 out of 115 votes to Ratzinger. Also, while early reports had indicated a strong early showing by the liberal Archbishop Emeritus of Milan, Carlo Maria Martini, Allen asserts that Martini did not receive any significant support. He even quotes an unnamed European cardinal as saying "I don't think we ever took Martini seriously, largely because of his health." (p. 112). Ratzinger improved to 50 votes on the second ballot (p. 113), gained a majority of the votes (at least 58) on the third (p. 115), and swept significantly past a two-thirds majority on the fourth. Some reports put his final vote total at almost 100 out of 115 votes (p. 116). The only other contender known to have emerged is the archbishop of Buenos Aires, Jorge Maria Bergoglio, who Allen lists as the top Latin American candidate without quantifying his support. (p. 114)

A brief recap of these nine conclaves reveals some intriguing patterns. There seems to be an alternation between "surprise choices" and "favorites". Giuseppe Sarto was a somewhat

surprising choice to succeed Leo XII in 1903, but Giacomo della Chiesa's election in 1914 was not as startling. Achille Ratti was totally unknown before the 1922 conclave, but the election of Eugenio Pacelli in 1939 was almost a foregone conclusion. The 1958 election of the elderly Angelo Roncalli was a shock, but no one was surprised to see Giovanni Battista Montini emerge as pope in 1963. In fact, only the twin conclaves of 1978 seem to break the cycle, as neither Albino Luciani nor Karol Wojtyła was considered "papible" before the election. However, this discrepancy is easily explained by Luciani's tragic death after only one month in office. Hence, the argument can be made that the cardinals were not so much electing a successor to John Paul I as they were scrambling to find an alternate replacement for Paul VI.

With a clearly established pattern of surprises followed by safer choices, it could have been predicted that an established frontrunner would succeed John Paul II. Unfortunately, most of the predictors were expecting a surprise. This led to speculation around candidates such as Francis Arinze, Claudio Hummes, and Oscar Rodriguez Maradiaga. Ratzinger, on the other hand, was dismissed by many as simply too obvious and controversial to be a serious contender. The fatal flaw in this reasoning is that it drew on the examples of the two most recent conclaves in 1978, when the 2005 conclave was far more analogous to the elections of 1939 and 1963. In both of those years, the recently deceased popes had been surprise choices, and both had surprising reigns. Pius XI took an amazingly strong stance against Fascism, while John XXIII turned the church upside down by convening Vatican II. The conclaves that elected their successors were seeking well known figures who were known quantities and represented a steady hand to guide the church. Eugenio Pacelli (Pius XII) and Giovanni Battista Montini (Paul VI) were simply "too obvious" to be elected. Hence, in 2005, the fact that Ratzinger was such an obvious choice made his election not only likely, but highly probable.

Another reason that Ratzinger was often dismissed was his advanced age. Most of the candidates predicted by Allen and Pham were in their 60s or early 70s (Allen, 2002, pp.162-176; Pham, 2004, pp.153-156). Such men would not have long papacies in the mold of John Paul II, but they would not die too quickly, either. These prognostications ignore a relatively clear pattern by which the age of the new pope is connected to the length of the dead pope's pontificate. For example, Pius XII's 19 year reign was one of the longest in recent history, and he was succeeded by the 76 year-old John XXIII. Conversely, the shortest pontificate of the 20th Century, the month-long reign of John Paul I, resulted in the election of the 58 year-old John Paul II. Papacies of middling length generated successors who were neither overly youthful nor overly aged. Examples of this would be the 15 year papacy of Paul VI, who was succeeded by the 65 year-old John Paul I, and the 7 year reign of Benedict XV, who was succeeded by the 64 year-old Pius XI. Of course, the pattern does not hold completely true at all times, but it does establish the possibility that popes who had long tenures are likely to be succeeded by elderly men who will have shorter pontificates. As John Paul II had one of the longest reigns in history, it should not have been surprising that he was succeeded by the 78 year-old Benedict XVI.

The Current College of Cardinals

Joseph Ratzinger's election in the 2005 conclave was, by all accounts, an absolute rout. The future Benedict XVI received an almost unheard-of level of support on the first ballot, between 40 and 50 votes depending on one's source of information (Allen, 2005, p.112; Weigel, 2005, p.147), and steamrolled to victory in four ballots. The contentious conclave predicted by the punditry simply failed to materialize. So, what led to this result, and why was it not foreseen? Many media accounts portrayed the conclave as a David-and-Goliath style battle between a

gargantuan conservative wing of the college (voting for Ratzinger) and a valiant band of progressives (voting first for Martini and then Bergoglio) (Allen, 2005, pp.112-114). However, this simplistic analysis simply does not reflect the nuanced process involved in such elections.

Ratzinger did have a monolithic base of support, but that does not mean that his election was a simple matter. Looking at vote totals alone cannot accurately show the dynamics of a conclave. The “real politicking,” according to author and Vatican watcher George Weigel, takes place in the “*prattiche*” (“exercises”), informal pre-conclave meetings between groups of cardinals. They can take place anywhere, including hotel rooms or even while a few cardinals are strolling around Rome. In fact, Cardinal Giovanni Bennelli, the alleged “great elector” of the first 1978 conclave, is said to have claimed that he orchestrated the election of John Paul I over a meal at Rome’s L’Eau Vive restaurant. (Weigel, 2005, p.121)

The *prattiche* system indicates that the election of a pope requires a good deal of coalition building, so it would be foolhardy to assume that it was merely a massive faction of conservatives that propelled Ratzinger to the papacy. Instead, the question should be what Ratzinger’s coalition looked like. What factions composed it, how it was organized in the *prattiche*? Likewise, it is worth examining those who opposed Ratzinger and why they failed so miserably. There are no official factions within the College of Cardinals, but unofficial groupings do exist, and they tend to come into sharp focus during conclaves. A key question for today’s speculators is where the faction lines are drawn. Are they ideological, regional, or divided along other lines?

One of the more thorough analyses of this question was done in John Allen’s *Conclave*. Allen postulates the existence of three or four “parties” among the cardinals, depending on which edition of the book one reads. In the original edition, he identifies three groups, which he whimsically labels “The Border Patrol”, the “Salt of the Earth Party”, and the “Reform Party”.

Border Patrol cardinals are defined as “theological conservatives worried about the impact of relativism and secularization on the Catholic Church.” (Allen, 2002, p.138) They tend to be interested in liturgy and doctrinal clarity and prioritize fidelity to doctrine over acceptability in the secular world. Hence, they advocate bold, conservative, and often controversial stands on doctrinal issues. (p.140) Perhaps the most interesting “fact” about this supposed party is the man that Allen labeled as its leader, then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (p.141). So, if these parties do exist, then the Border Patrollers soundly won the last election. Others mentioned as members included Cardinal Protodeacon Jorge Medina Estevez (who announced Ratzinger’s election), Vienna Archbishop Cristoph Schönborn (labeled by Allen as a mastermind of the Ratzinger candidacy), Americans Bernard Law and Francis George, India’s Ivan Dias, Canada’s Aloysius Ambrozic, Ukraine’s Marian Jaworski, and Slovakia’s Jozef Tomko. (p. 143).

Conversely, the Reform Party advocates an “agenda of internal reform in the church along the lines of the Second Vatican Council.” Their positions favor, “greater collegiality, or decentralization, a greater tolerance of diversity and experimentation, and a reform of the Roman Curia in order to make the papacy more acceptable ecumenically.” (Allen, 2002, p.151) They also see the papacy of John Paul II as having cut short necessary reforms set in motion by Vatican II (p.152). In short, they are the “liberals” opposed to the Border Patrol “conservatives”. Specifically, Allen label former Milan Archbishop Carlo Maria Martini, Belgium’s Godfried Daneels, America’s Roger Mahony, and the German duo of Karl Lehmann and Walter Kasper as Reformers (p.156). Based on the 2005 conclave, one would assume that the Reform Party the

smallest and least effective faction. This would be based on the fact that Martini is said to have received some votes but was never seen as a serious candidate.

Finally, there is the Salt of the Earth Party. Allen's definition of this "party" puts it somewhat outside the left-right doctrinal debate between the Border Patrol and Reform cardinals. It also allows for cardinals of several different ideological stripes to be identified as "Salt of the Earth" members. "Salt of the Earth cardinals", says Allen, "believe that the people of God should not be hung up primarily on intraecclesiastical theological debates. Their focus is outside, rather than inside, the institutional church. They are more concerned with what they see as the burning issues of the day, such as poverty, abortion, and war." (Allen, 2002, pp.144-145). The obvious problem with this definition is that it says nothing in regard to what positions the cardinals take on such issues. Hence, Allen splits the party into right and left wings.

The right wing is said to adhere to the ideology of "integralism", which is defined by Allen as "the belief that the politics and culture of society should be ordered *wholly* according to the teachings of the Catholic Church." (italics his) (Allen, 2004, p. 145) As an example of pure integralism, Allen cites the Spanish regime of Francisco Franco, which made some Catholic teachings the law of the land. (p.145). However, he says that integralism can also be expressed by the claim that church teaching should "almost automatically become civil law." The exemplar of this faction is Cardinal Camillo Ruini, the Vicar General of the Diocese of Rome (essentially Rome's bishop, except that the post is technically held by the pope). Cardinal Ruini was a major figure in the Church's opposition to the contraceptive/abortive "morning after pill" in Italy. Other cardinals labeled as members of this faction are Columbia's Alphonso Lopez Trujillo, Former Vatican Secretary of State Angelo Sodano, Poland's Jozef Glemp, Mexico's Norberto Rivera Carrera, Peru's Juan Cipriani Thorne, and Spain's Antonio Maria Rouco Valera.

The left wing of the Salt of the Earth Party, however, is interested more in "questions of social and economic justice, such as debt relief, globalization and racial justice." As opposed to the right wing, they do not wish to use the state to enforce church teachings. Instead they want to "identify the root causes of poverty, hunger, illiteracy, disease, and racial prejudice, and then work to remedy those causes." Cardinals included in this faction include America's Theodore McCarrick, Honduras' Oscar Rodriguez Maradiaga, Indonesia's Julius Darmaatmadja, and South Africa's Wilfrid Fox Napier. (Allen, 2002, pp.149-151) Strangely, in his 2004 "revised and updated" edition of *Conclave*, Allen splits the "Salt of the Earth" party in two, labeling the left wing as the "Social Justice Party" and the right wing as "The Integralists" (pp. 153-160).

Of course, these factions are only theoretical. It is possible that they do not exist exactly as described, and they may not exist at all. With such a small electorate, it is certainly possible that groupings could form on a more personal basis rather than a nebulous left-right divide. This case is made by Professor Stephen Schneck of Catholic University of America. He says,

Here in the U.S. we tend to think simply in terms of red state/blue state or conservatives and liberals. Among the cardinals and in the Vatican there is some of this, but it is generally trumped by the politics of personality and personal connections. These personal connections form clusters of bishops around the world that are cemented by patronage. I would argue that it is these patronage clusters and their alliances with other patronage clusters that form the real "political parties" of the Church. And, mixed in with the prevailing politics of patronage clusters and the less important liberal/conservative dimension are things like the politics of fiscal reform and the increasingly important West vs. non-West dynamic. (S. Schneck, personal communication)

So, according to Professor Schneck, the politics of a conclave are not so much about ideological differences as they are about personal connection between cardinals.

While it may be impossible to determine who is involved in such “patronage clusters”, the “West vs. non-West dynamic” can be quantified by dividing the current cardinals into regional blocs. This study divides the world into eight regions: Asia, Africa, Latin America, North America (U.S. and Canada), Oceania, Eastern Europe, Western Europe (excluding Italy), and Italy. While it may seem strange to separate Italy from Western Europe, but the Italians are the largest national delegation in the college, and they held a monopoly on the Papacy for four centuries before the election of John Paul II. The cardinal electors are currently dispersed as follows: 12 Asians, 9 Africans, 21 Latin Americans, 16 North Americans, 2 Oceanians, 12 Eastern Europeans, 27 non-Italian Western Europeans, and 20 Italians. (“The College of Cardinals: Biographical Notes”).

It is worth noting that these are *current* numbers, not the numbers from the 2005 conclave. The composition of the college has changed slightly since 2005; some electors have either died or reached age 80 and Benedict XVI has named 23 new cardinals of voting age (The College of Cardinals: Biographical Notes”). If one defines the “West” as including all of the European regions, North America, and Oceania (the two cardinals are from westernized Australia and New Zealand) and the “non-West” as including Asia, Africa, and Latin America, then 68 cardinals are Western while 42 are not. This gives the non-West a large fraction of the votes, but leaves the West with a firm majority.

However, this divide may not be the only way that the cardinals could break along regional lines. One could define a divide between Europe and the rest of the world. It has been over a millennium since a man of non-European origin has held the papacy, the last being St. Gregory III, a Syrian who reigned from 731-741 A.D. (McBrien, 1997, p.119). However, the internationalization of the College of Cardinals could spell doom for Europe’s papal monopoly. After Italy lost its majority vote in the College of Cardinals, it took only four elections before a non-Italian pope was elected (Pham, 2004, 117-132). So, the demise of the college’s European majority could mean that the election of a non-European pope is imminent. At present, only 50 cardinal electors are European, while 60 are not (“The College of Cardinals: Biographical Notes”). Hence, if one accepts the “Europe vs. the world” divide, it is likely that the next pope will be a non-European.

It seems highly unlikely that any of these hypothetical arrangements will materialize in a pure form. If one looks back at Professor Schneck’s comment, he asserts that at least four different dynamics may be operating at the same time: patronage clusters, left-right politics, the politics of issues such as fiscal reform, and a divide between East and West. With so many different dynamics at play, discerning concrete factions is an exercise in futility.

However, one can identify a number of loose factions by examining last time when they were in public view, the *prattiche* before the 2005 conclave. There are no official records of the meetings between cardinals, but that does not mean that they are as private as the participants would like. Wherever there are secrets, there will be leaks to the media, and conclaves are no exception. George Weigel recorded much of the information that emerged from the 2005 *prattiche* in his conclave diary, which he then included in his 2005 book, *God’s Choice: Pope Benedict and the Future of the Catholic Church*. The diary is far from comprehensive, and there is no way to determine its level of accuracy, but it does paint a rudimentary picture of the factions in the College of Cardinals. This makes it possible to draw some faction lines within the College of Cardinals, and to see how those factions voted in the 2005 conclave. Due to the

secrecy involved in the election process, it may not be possible to discern all of the existing factions. However, one can determine which factions are known and which groups of cardinals need to be studied further.

Weigel's first mention of *prattiche* activity comes from Tuesday, April 12th, 2005, six days before the opening of the conclave. He notes that, while much media speculation had centered on the possibility that a Latin American might be elected, the region's cardinals did not seem to agree. "There is...no Latin American bloc", he says, "and certainly not a Latin American bloc determined to elect one of its own. On this sixth day before voting begins, many of the Latin Americans, except the Brazilians and Cardinal Oscar Rodríguez Maradiaga of Honduras, seem to be inclining toward Cardinal Ratzinger as the next pope, with (Mexico City Archbishop) Cardinal Rivera Carrera as one of Ratzinger's chief supporters; some are still inclined toward Cardinal Bergoglio." (Weigel, 2005, p.129) So, Latin Americans made up a piece of the Ratzinger coalition; more specifically, *conservative* Latin Americans. The cardinals listed as opposing Ratzinger are also key, as they include two men mentioned by the media as potential popes: Rodríguez Maradiaga and (by implication) the powerful Brazilian curialist Claudio Hummes. So, the Latin Americans were not inclined to vote regionally, and a split existed between the Brazilians and the cardinals from Spanish-speaking Latin American nations.

The opposition to Ratzinger was also taking shape on April 12th. Says Weigel "Their current plan is, reportedly, a two stage strategy: First, block Cardinal Ratzinger's election through Wednesday (the third day of balloting); then put {Milan Archbishop} Cardinal Tettamanzi forward as the acceptable compromise and get him elected on Thursday." (Weigel, 2005, p.130) In hindsight, of course, this was an ineffective strategy as Ratzinger was elected on Tuesday and Tettamanzi was never even a contender.

In addition to goings on in the *prattiche*, it may be just as important to consider those cardinals who were not involved. Specifically, Weigel makes one note on April 13th that African cardinals Emmanuel Wamala of Uganda and Gabriel Zubeir Wako of Sudan were complaining that they and other Third World cardinals were not being included (Weigel, 2005, p.131). Hence, at least for 2005, the idea of an African or Asian pope was beginning to seem unlikely.

By Thursday, April 14th, the picture seems to have become even clearer, as Weigel lists a number of important cardinals who were either promoting or opposing Ratzinger. In the Ratzinger camp were the Italian cardinals Ruini, Biffi, Bertone, and De Giorgi; along with Cardinals Schönborn of Austria, Meisner of Germany, Pell of Australia, Stafford of the USA, Oullet of Canada, Herranz of Spain, and Cipriani Thorne of Peru. (Weigel, 2005, p.132) This was a broad based coalition with support from all corners of the globe. Ratzinger's opponents were also scattered around the world.

Weigel identified three anti-Ratzinger factions, all with different agendas: First, there were those who wanted the church to focus more on political and economic issues such as globalization. These supposedly included both Cardinal Rodríguez Maradiaga and Cardinal Hummes. The second strand of opposition was from Italians in the Curia who wanted to restore Italian leadership of the Church. This group is said to have included Cardinals Re, Sepe, Marchisano, and Poletto; along with the Vatican's powerful Secretary of State, Cardinal Angelo Sodano. Lastly, there was opposition among the college's "progressives". This faction included the prominent Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini, as well as Cardinals Daneels of Belgium, O'Brien of Scotland, Murphy-O'Connor of England, Lehmann of Germany, Napier of South Africa, McCarrick of Washington D.C., and Mahony of Los Angeles. (Weigel, 2005, pp.133-134) So, in

summary, Ratzinger was opposed primarily by politically-minded Latin Americans, Italians bent on taking back the papacy, and doctrinal progressives.

This third faction is intriguing, as it includes most of the cardinals labeled by Allen as the “Reform Party”. So, it appears that at least one of his speculated parties does actually exist. However, determining the existence or non-existence of the other parties may be a little more complicated. The supposed “Salt of the Earth Party” postulated in the first edition of *Conclave* did indeed split into at least two factions, roughly resembling the Integralist/Social Justice divide identified in the 2004 edition. Cardinal Camillo Ruini, identified by Allen as a prominent member of the “Integralist” faction (Allen, 2004, p.155) was actively promoting Ratzinger, while “Social Justice” cardinals Rodriguez Maradiaga and McCarrick were opposing him (though Weigel’s diary seems to indicate that McCarrick was actually working with the Reform Party (Weigel, 2005, p.134). This leaves us with the “Border Patrol” party, which is impossible to confirm due to Ratzinger’s almost ridiculous margin of victory. Specifically, the fact that Ratzinger made such a strong showing on the first ballot makes it hard to determine whether his support came from a monolithic Border Patrol Party or a coalition of smaller factions.

In an attempt to make some sense of this convoluted situation, it seems necessary to make a quick review of all the factions mentioned by Weigel. First, there are the three factions that voted against Ratzinger: Latin American Progressives (primarily Brazilians), Italians who wanted the papacy returned to Italian hands, and the “Reform Party”. For the purposes of this paper, these groups are collectively referred to as the “Opposition”. Then there are the cardinals who elected Ratzinger as Benedict XVI, which this paper will label “The Ratzinger Coalition”. This group is not as well described by Weigel, who gives the names of cardinals involved in planning the Ratzinger candidacy but does not identify any clear-cut factions among them. This may indicate the existence of a monolithic Border Patrol Party, but it may simply mean that Weigel was not able to identify divisions among factions that were cooperating with each other.

Judging by the fact that the Opposition was composed of several factions, it seems logical to assume that the Ratzinger Coalition might also be composed of smaller groups. In fact, Weigel seems to drop a few hints that this might be the case. For instance, he notes that Camillo Ruini was a major figure in planning and executing Ratzinger’s election, but also that Ruini himself received a number of votes on the first ballot. (Weigel, 2005, p.147) This is interesting, as Allen had identified Ruini with the Integralist Party rather than the Border Patrol Party (Allen, 2004, p.155). So, the fact that Ruini had command of a number of votes may confirm the existence of “the Integralists” as a separate entity from the rest of the Ratzinger Coalition. However, as the existence of a full-blown Integralist faction cannot be positively confirmed, and considering the added fact that Ruini seems to have had some command his voters, it is probably better to label this group simply as the “Ruini Faction”.

Likewise, Weigel indicated that a number of more conservative Latin American cardinals had been leaning toward Jorge Mario Bergoglio of Argentina as a candidate (Weigel, 2005, p.129), and indeed Bergoglio did receive a number of votes during the conclave (apparently making him the de facto Opposition candidate) (Allen, 2005, p.114). However, Weigel did not list Bergoglio among the Latin Americans opposing Ratzinger (Weigel, 2005, p.129), so it is possible that he was able to sway many of his original supporters to become part of the Ratzinger Coalition. Regardless, there were a number of people supporting him, so it may be possible that there is a “Bergoglio faction”. However, it is not clear whether Bergoglio had any real control over this faction, and there is no record of any organized effort to mount a Bergoglio candidacy.

So, it is probably best to label these cardinals simply as “Mainline Latin Americans” (as opposed to the progressive faction mentioned earlier).

Weigel also claims that Uganda’s Emmanuel Wamala and Sudan’s Gabriel Zubeir Wako complained that Third World cardinals were left out of the *prattiche* (Weigel, 2005, p.131). Hence the Africans seem to form a faction, possibly in alliance with the rest of the Third World. Still, Weigel notes that many of the Third World Cardinals hold very conservative doctrinal views, similar to what Allen calls a “Border Patrol” ideology, and voted enthusiastically for Ratzinger (Weigel, 2005, p.152). So, Third World conservatives were clearly involved in the Ratzinger Coalition. However, their exclusion from the *prattiche* process indicates that they are unconnected to the factions which planned Ratzinger’s election, and hence form a separate bloc.

Finally, Weigel notes that the planners of the Ratzinger candidacy included Cardinals Schönborn, Meisner, Bertone, and Biffi. All of these men were labeled by Allen as exemplary members of the Border Patrol Party. Hence, while it cannot be said conclusively that the Border Patrol Party exists as a monolithic force, it appears that many of its identified members did work in concert in 2005. So, in the absence of better research into divisions among the cardinals, this paper will make the assumption that the Border Patrol Party does in fact exist as a faction.

Hence, as far as can be discerned from current materials, there were seven known factions at the 2005 Conclave: The Reform Party, the Italian supremacists (for lack of a better term), the Latin American Progressives, the Ruini Faction, the Mainline Latin Americans, the Third World, and the Border Patrol Party. The first three of these seem form the Opposition, while the last four probably constitute the Ratzinger Coalition. Obviously, this is not a complete or fully accurate list, and much more research needs to be done to determine the accuracy and/or size of these factions. However, such rudimentary groupings at least show some of the dynamics in the current college and give some hints as to how the next conclave may unfold

Weigel’s diary also mentions one key fact that is worth noting here. While the current college has 60 non-European cardinal electors to 50 Europeans (“The College of Cardinals: Biographical Notes”), this was not the case in 2005. Instead, the non-Europeans held only a one-vote majority of 59 to 58. However, two Third World cardinals were too ill to participate, giving Europe a one vote majority of 58 to 57 (Weigel, 2005, p.126). While this is not enough votes to elect a pope, it is considerably different from the current situation, and it will be interesting to see whether the non-Europeans continue to increase their numbers under Pope Benedict.

Looking Ahead

As has been demonstrated, politics among the cardinals is complex and extremely difficult to predict. However, some of the dynamics illuminated by this study do make it slightly easier to draw some conclusions about future conclaves. While the data presented here certainly cannot predict who will be the next pope, it does show some clear cut conclusions about who will *not* be the next pope.

Before launching into new conclusions about cardinals who might be eliminated as candidates to succeed Benedict, it is necessary to first mention some of the unspoken restrictions (or speculated restrictions) on papal candidacies, as this study aims to add to the established knowledge on the subject rather than attempting to undermine it. Hence, it might be possible to eliminate even more cardinals from contention, leaving a shorter list of potential popes.

According to John Allen, “one of the few near-certainties about the election of the next pope is that it won’t be an American.” (Allen, 2004, p.185). The church must be politically neutral, and the election of a pope from the world’s lone superpower would, in the minds of

some, compromise the church's independence as a political entity. "If the College of Cardinals were to elect an American," says Allen, "the international press would immediately speculate that Vatican decisions were being scripted by the State Department and the CIA. It's the same reason that an American cannot head the United Nations or other international bodies." (Allen, 2004, p.185) Currently, there are 18 American cardinal electors ("The College of Cardinals: Biographical Sketches", 2008), making them the second largest national delegation (after Italy). Hence, their disqualification alone removes a large bloc of cardinals from consideration.

Allen also stated that conventional wisdom indicated that John Paul II, a Pole, would probably not be succeeded by another Eastern European (Allen, 2004, p.164). This makes sense, as the highly globalized College of Cardinals would probably frown upon awarding consecutive papacies to one country or region. So, it was absolutely certain that John Paul would not be succeeded by a Polish cardinal, and extending that taboo to other Eastern European was probably a smart move. Likewise, it is likely as safe prediction that Benedict XVI will not be succeeded by a German, and probably not by a Pole either, considering that John Paul II is likely to continue to cast his shadow over the church. Hence, there is strong evidence that three national delegations can be decisively ruled out as the home of the next pope: The United States, Germany, and Poland. There are currently 6 cardinals from Germany and 4 from Poland ("The College of Cardinals: Biographical Sketches", 2008). One interesting question raised by this conclusion is whether the prohibition on Germans will extend beyond Germany's borders to include other Germanic countries. If this is the case, it would be possible to eliminate at least one widely mentioned candidate: Cardinal Christoph Schönborn, the 63 year-old Archbishop of Vienna, who was often mentioned as a *papible* in 2005 and tagged by Allen as a key member of the Border Patrol Party and an engineer of the Ratzinger candidacy.

On top of these expected write-offs, the dynamics described in this paper seem to indicate that several other groups can also be eliminated, or at least discounted, as contenders for the papacy. The first would be the so-called Reform Party, who seem to have found themselves in a distinct ideological minority in 2005. While Carlo Maria Martini was originally thought to have been one of Ratzinger's main rivals for the papacy, the most reliable current reports (Allen and Weigel) say that he never attracted any significant number of votes and was never thought of as a serious candidate. While it is not known exactly how many Reform cardinals there are, it is probably safe to eliminate those who are mentioned by Allen who are specifically mentioned as archetypes of the faction and those labeled by Weigel as their 2005 collaborators.

Another key factor could be age. As shown earlier, there may be a connection between a new pontiff's age and the length of his predecessor's reign. Elderly candidates such as Joseph Ratzinger are usually only elected to succeed long-reigning popes like John Paul II., while shorter papacies tend to generate younger successors. It is likely that, due to his age, Benedict XVI will have a short pontificate, so the chances of an elderly cardinal being elected to succeed him are slim. Hence, it makes sense to eliminate the oldest cardinals from contention.

So, how old is too old? There is no absolute answer to that question, but this paper will exclude cardinals who were born before 1933, as they have attained the age of 75 at the time of writing. Setting the cutoff age at 75 is an arbitrary gesture, but there is some reasoning behind it. All cardinals born after 1933 are already in their upper seventies. Were the conclave to occur immediately, Benedict would be an extremely short-reigning pope, making the election of an elderly successor improbable. However, as Benedict's reign gets longer, making it possible for a septuagenarian to be elected, the oldest cardinals will reach the age of 80 and lose their voting rights. One could make the case that the cutoff should be set at an even lower age, but it is

possible that cardinals currently in their early seventies could be contenders if (and only if) Benedict were to die in the next two or three years.

67 of the 121 cardinals can be eliminated based on the factors listed above. However, one might also consider a list of groups that, while not definitively eliminated, are highly unlikely to produce Pope Benedict's successor. For instance, if one considers the looming memory of John Paul II, it seems unlikely that a Slav will be elected. This would eliminate all cardinals from Eastern Europe. Weigel also notes that many Latin American cardinals were in "broad agreement" that Italy should not retake the papacy in 2005 (Weigel, 2005, p.129). At, at present, there are 20 Latin Americans in the Sacred College. This is not enough to block an Italian from reaching a two-thirds majority, but is a rather large bloc. If cardinals from other regions feel the same way about an Italian candidacy, or if an Italian candidate draws significant opposition for some other reason, a united Latin American bloc could ensure that an Italian will not be elected. It may be rash to summarily eliminate all 20 Italian cardinals for this reason, but the potential for strong opposition makes it less likely that an Italian will become pope.

In total, 83 of the 121 cardinal electors fall into one or more of the categories listed above. If their election is not an outright impossibility, it is definitely unlikely. This leaves a list of 38 cardinals who cannot be summarily eliminated, and hence meet the most basic qualifications of an electable candidate (see appendix for the list of 38, as well a breakdown of the eliminated cardinals). Of the 38, only ten are European, while the other 25 hail from other continents. So, if the conclusions of this paper are correct, then the odds are stacked highly in the favor of a non-European being elected as the successor to Benedict XVI

Depending on how long Benedict remains in office, he could (and likely will) appoint more cardinals who will meet this study's criteria for a possible pope, so the list is sure to grow. Also, one or more of the criteria could turn out to be invalid, especially the exclusion of East Europeans and Italians, which are based on slightly less solid claims than the other exclusions. However, one could also argue that any new cardinals created by Pope Benedict will have less seniority in the college or familiarity with the other cardinals as the 38 men listed, making them less likely to be elected. Furthermore, the exclusions of the East European and Italian cardinals are backed up by the claims of Allen and Weigel.

This thesis has identified numerous dynamics in the College of Cardinals which have an impact on the outcomes of papal elections. This made it possible to construct a relatively detailed, if incomplete, profile of the next conclave. A historical analysis seems to show alternation between popes whose election seemed inevitable and popes whose election was unforeseen. It also appears that there is a rough connection between the length of a pope's pontificate and his successor's age. Hence, Benedict XVI, as pre-election frontrunner and an probably a short-reigning pope, is likely to be succeeded by a younger cardinal who is not a media favorite. In addition, seven factions have been identified among the cardinals (assuming that George Weigel's diary was accurate). This could be a useful tool to future predictors, as it is grounded in the supposed events of an actual conclave and more specific than Allen's "party" breakdown.

Finally, when all of the identified dynamics are added together and mixed with some pieces of conventional wisdom about conclaves, it becomes possible to eliminate large numbers of cardinals as potential successors to Benedict XVI, leaving only 38 cardinals who are not disqualified by age, nationality, or ideology.

Of course, there can only be one pope, and a list of 38 names cannot predict the outcome of a conclave, no matter how accurate it is. Hence, further studies must be done to prove the

validity of this list and/or narrow down the list of potential candidates. Specifically, a detailed examination of the College of Cardinals is needed to determine each cardinal's ideology and alliances with other cardinals. Only after such information is compiled can a truly useful list of factions be made. While this study identified seven groups operating within the 2005 conclave, it is currently impossible to gauge the total number of factions within the college, the number of cardinals in each faction, or which factions are most likely to form alliances.

If the validity of this study's conclusions can be proved, the next task for researchers would be to identify which of the 38 qualifying cardinals are most likely to become actual candidates for the papacy. This would require the identification of the cardinals who are likely to be dominant during the *prattiche* leading up to the next conclave, as well as an analysis of those cardinals' priorities, issue stances, and connections within the college. In short, the kingmakers must be identified, and the type of "king" they want must be determined.

While papal elections will likely maintain a perpetual aura of unpredictability, this study has attempted to make them slightly more understandable. The process may be complex, but that should not preclude political scientists from attempting to demystify it. Hopefully, the conclusions drawn here will prove to be useful to tomorrow's Vatican watchers; and perhaps those people will one day unlock the secrets of the world's most secretive election process.

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APPENDIX:

A Breakdown of the College of Cardinals

38 Potential Popes

Name	Position	Region	Nation	Born	Cardinal Since
Okogie, Anthony Olubunmi	Archbishop of Lagos	Africa	Nigeria	1936	2003
Sarr, Theodore-Adrien	Archbishop of Dakar	Africa	Senegal	1936	2007
Napier, Wilfrid Fox	Archbishop of Durban	Africa	S. Africa	1941	2001
Zubeir Wako, Gabriel	Archbishop of Khartoum	Africa	Sudan	1941	2003
Njue, John	Archbishop of Nairobi	Africa	Kenya	1944	2007
Pengo, Polycarp	Archbishop of Dar-es-Salaam	Africa	Tanzania	1944	1998
Turkson, Peter Kodwo Appiah	Archbishop of Cape Coast	Africa	Ghana	1948	2003
Darmaatmadja, Julius Riyadi	Archbishop of Jakarta	Asia	Indonesia	1934	1994
Pham Minh Mân, Jean-Baptiste	Archbishop of Ho Chi Minh City	Asia	Vietnam	1934	2003
Dias, Ivan	Congregation for Evangelization of Peoples, Chancellor of Pontifical Urban University	Asia	India	1936	2001
Toppo, Telesphore Placidus	Archbishop of Ranchi	Asia	India	1939	2003
Gracias, Oswald	Archbishop of Bonmbay	Asia	India	1944	2007
Rosales, Gaudencio Borbon	Archbishop of Manila	Asia	Phillipines	1944	2007
Hummes, Claudio	Congregation for the Clergy	Lat. Am.	Brazil	1934	2001
Lopez Trujillo, Alfonso	Pont. Council for the Family	Lat. Am.	Colombia	1935	1983
Bergoglio, Jorge Mario	Archbishop of Buenos Aires	Lat. Am.	Argentina	1936	2001
Lopez Rodriguez, Nicolas de Jesus	Archbishop of Santo Domingo	Lat. Am.	Dom. Rep.	1936	1991
Ortega y Alamino, Jaime Lucas	Archbishop of Havana	Lat. Am.	Cuba	1936	1994
Terrazas Sandoval, Julio	Archbishop of Santa Cruz de la Sierra	Lat. Am.	Bolivia	1936	2001
Rivera Carrera, Norberto	Archbishop of Mexico	Lat. Am.	Mexico	1942	1998
Rodriguez Maradiaga, Oscar Andres	Archbishop of Tegucigalpa	Lat. Am.	Honduras	1942	2001
Urosa Savino, Jorge Liberato	Archbishop of Caracas	Lat. Am.	Venezuela	1942	2006
Cipriani Thorne, Juan Luis	Archbishop of Lima, Primate of Peru	Lat. Am.	Peru	1943	2001
Sandri, Leonardo	Congregation for Oriental Churches	Lat. Am.	Argentina	1943	2007
Robles Ortega, Francisco	Archbishop of Monterrey	Lat. Am.	Mexico	1949	2007
Scherer, Odilo Pedro	Archbishop of Sao Paulo	Lat. Am.	Brazil	1949	2007
Turcotte, Jean-Claude	Archbishop of Montreal	N. Am	Canada	1936	1994
Oullet, Marc	Archbishop of Quebec, Primate of Canada	N. Am	Canada	1944	2003
Pell, George	Archbishop of Sydney	Oceania	Australia	1941	2003
Amigo Vallejo, Carlos	Archbishop of Seville	W. Eur	Spain	1934	2003
da Cruz Policarpo, Jose	Patriarch of Lisbon	W. Eur	Portugal	1936	2001
Rouco Valera, Antonio Maria	Archbishop of Madrid	W. Eur	Spain	1936	1998
Martinez Sistach, Lluís	Archbishop of Barcelona	W. Eur	Spain	1937	2007
Brady, Sean Baptist	Archbishop of Armaugh, Primate of Ireland	W. Eur	Ireland	1939	2007

Name	Position	Region	Nation	Born	Cardinal Since
Vingt-Trois, Andre	Archbishop of Paris	W. Eur	France	1942	2007
Tauran, Jean-Louis	Pont. Council for Inter-religious Dialogue	W. Eur	France	1943	2003
Ricard, Jean-Pierre	Archbishop of Bordeaux	W. Eur	France	1944	2006
Cañizares Llovera, Antonio	Archbishop of Toledo, Primate of Spain	W. Eur	Spain	1945	2006
Barbarin, Phillippe	Archbishop of Lyon	W. Eur	France	1950	2003

Author's note (added 7/12/2008): Cardinal Alfonso Lopez Trujillo passed away on April 19th, 2008, after this list was compiled.

Italians and Eastern Europeans who otherwise fit the criteria (unlikely but possible)

Name	Position	Region	Nation	Born	Cardinal Since
Rode, Franc	Congregation for Institutes of Consecrated Life and Societies of Apostolic Life	E. Eur	Slovenia	1934	2006
Bačkis, Audrys	Archbishop of Vilnius	E. Eur	Lithuania	1937	2001
Dziwisz, Stanislaw	Archbishop of Krakow	E. Eur	Poland	1939	2006
Grocholewski, Zenon	Congregation for Catholic Education, Chancellor of Pontifical Gregorian University	E. Eur	Poland	1939	2001
Puljić, Vinko	Archbishop of Vrhbosna, Sarajevo	E. Eur	Bosnia	1945	1994
Ryłko, Stanislaw	Ponifical Council for the Laity	E. Eur	Poland	1945	2007
Bozanić, Josip	Archichop of Zagreb	E. Eur	Croatia	1949	2003
Erdő, Peter	Archbishop Eszterom-Budapest	E. Eur	Hungary	1952	2003
Bertone, Tarcisio	Sec. Of State, Camerlengo	Italy	Italy	1934	2003
Re, Giovanni Battista	Congregation for Bishops. Pont. Council for Latin America	Italy	Italy	1934	2001
Tettamanzi, Dionigi	Archbishop of Milan	Italy	Italy	1934	1998
Lajolo, Giovanni	Governor of Vatican City	Italy	Italy	1935	2007
Antonelli, Ennio	Archbishop of Florence	Italy	Italy	1936	2003
Nicora, Attilio	Pres. Of the Administration of the Patrimony of the Apostolic See	Italy	Italy	1937	2003
Caffara, Carlo	Archbishop of Bologna	Italy	Italy	1938	2006
Vallini, Agostino	Prefect, Apostolic Signatura	Italy	Italy	1940	2006
Scola, Angelo	Patriarch of Venice	Italy	Italy	1941	2003
Bagnasco, Angelo	Archbishop of Genoa, President of Italian Bishops	Italy	Italy	1943	2007
Comastri, Angelo	Vicar General of Vatican City	Italy	Italy	1943	2007
Sepe, Crescenzo	Archbishop of Naples	Italy	Italy	1943	2001

Eliminated due to Advanced Age

Name	Position	Region	Nation	Born	Cardinal Since
Shirayanagi, Peter Seichi	Archbishop Emeritus of Tokyo	Asia	Japan	1928	1994
Biffi, Giacomo	Archbishop Emeritus of Bologna	Italy	Italy	1928	1985
Wetter, Friedrich	Archbishop Emeritus of Munich and Freising	W. Eur	Germany	1928	1985
Kitbunchu, Michael Michai	Archbishop of Bangkok	Asia	Thailand	1929	1983
Glemp, Jozef	Archbishop Emeritus of Warsaw, Primate of Poland	E. Eur	Poland	1929	1983
Marchisano, Francesco	President of the Labor Office of the Apostolic See	Italy	Italy	1929	2003
Castrillon Hoyos, Dario	President of <i>Ecclesia Dei</i>	Lat. Am.	Colombia	1929	1998
Tumi, Christian Wiyghan	Archbishop of Douala	Africa	Cameroon	1930	1988
Daoud, Ignace Moussa I	Congregation for Oriental Churches (Emeritus)	Asia	Syria	1930	2001
Pujats, Jānis	Archbishop of Riga	E. Eur	Latvia	1930	2001
De Giorgi, Salvatore	Archbishop of Palermo	Italy	Italy	1930	1998
Giordano, Michele	Arhbishop Emeritus of Naples	Italy	Italy	1930	1988
Ambrozic, Aloysius	Archbishop Emeritus of Toronto	N. Am	Canada	1930	1998
Maida, Adam Joseph	Archbishop of Detroit	N. Am	USA	1930	1994
McCarrick, Theodore "Ted"	Archbishop Emeritus of Washington	N. Am	USA	1930	2001
Williams, Thomas Stafford	Archbishop Emeritus of Wellington	Oceania	New Zealand	1930	1983
Herranz, Julian	Disciplinary Commission of the Curia	W. Eur	Spain	1930	2003
Poupard, Paul	Pontifical Council for Culture	W. Eur	France	1930	1985
Cheong Jin-Suk, Nicholas	Archbishop of Seoul	Asia	S. Korea	1931	2006
Vidal, Ricardo J.	Archbishop of Cebu	Asia	Phillipines	1931	1985
Ruini, Camillo	Vicar General of the Diocese Rome	Italy	Italy	1931	1991
Sebastiani, Sergio	President of the Prefecture for Economic Affairs of the Holy See	Italy	Italy	1931	2001
Keeler, William Henry	Archbishop Emeritus of Baltimore	N. Am	USA	1931	1994
Law, Bernard	Archbishop Emeritus of Boston, Archpreist of St., Mary Major Basilia	N. Am	USA	1931	1985
Gracia-Gasco Vicente, Agustin	Archbishop of Valencia	W. Eur	Spain	1931	2007
Panafieu, Bernard	Archbishop Emeritus of Mersailed	W. Eur	France	1931	2003
Simonis, Adrianus	Archbishop Emeritus of Utrecht	W. Eur	Netherlands	1931	1985
Arinze, Francis	Congregation for Divine Worship & Sacraments	Africa	Nigeria	1932	1985
Zen Ze-Kiun, Joseph	Bishop of Hong Kong	Asia	China (HK)	1932	2006

Name	Position	Region	Nation	Born	Cardinal Since
Vlk, Miroslav	Archbishop of Prague	E. Eur	Czech Rep.	1932	1994
Martino, Renato	Pont. Council for Justice, Pont. Council for Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itenerant People	Italy	Italy	1932	2003
Quezada Toruño, Rodolfo	Archbishop of Guatemala	Lat. Am.	Guatemala	1932	2003
Rubiano Saenz, Pedro	Archbishop of Bogota	Lat. Am.	Colombia	1932	2001
Scheid, Eusebio Oscar	Archbishop of Rio de Janiero	Lat. Am.	Brazil	1932	2003
Egan, Edward	Archbishop of New York	N. Am	USA	1932	2001
Stafford, James Francis	Major Penitentiary of the Apostolic Penitentiay	N. Am	USA	1932	1998
Murphy-O'Connor, Cormac	Archbishop of Westminster	W. Eur	UK (Eng.)	1932	2001
Saraiva Martins, Jose	Congregation for the Causes of Saints	W. Eur	Portugal	1932	2001
Schwery, Henri	Bishop Emeritus of Sion	W. Eur	Switzerland	1932	1991
Husar, Lubomyr	Major Archbishop of Kyiv-Halyc (Ukr.)	E. Eur	Ukraine	1933	2001
Farina, Raffaele	Archivist and Librarian of the Church	Italy	Italy	1933	2007
Poletto, Severino	Archbship of Turin	Italy	Italy	1933	2001
Agnelo, Geraldo Majella	Archbishop of San Salvador da Bahia	Lat. Am.	Brazil	1933	2001
Errazuriz Ossa, Fransisco Javier	Archbishop of Santiago	Lat. Am.	Chile	1933	2001
Lozano Barragan, Javier	Pont. Council for Health Pastoral Care	Lat. Am.	Mexico	1933	2003
Sandoval Iñiguez, Juan	Archbishop of Guadalajara	Lat. Am.	Mexico	1933	1994
Daneels, Godfried	Archbishop of Mechelen-Brussel	W. Eur	Belgium	1933	1983
Kasper, Walter	Pont. Council for Promotion of Christian Unity	W. Eur	Germany	1933	2001
Meisner, Joachim	Archbishop of Cologne	W. Eur	Germany	1933	1983

Eliminated due to Germanic, Polish, or U.S. nationality

Name	Position	Region	Nation	Born	Cardinal Since
Dziwisz, Stanislaw	Archbishop of Krakow	E. Eur	Poland	1939	2006
Glemp, Jozef	Archbishop Emeritus of Warsaw	E. Eur	Poland	1929	1983
Grocholewski, Zenon	Congregation for Catholic Education	E. Eur	Poland	1939	2001
Ryłko, Stanislaw	Ponifical Council for the Laity	E. Eur	Poland	1945	2007
DiNardo, Daniel	Archbishop of Galveston-Houston	N. Am	USA	1949	2007
Egan, Edward	Archbishop of New York	N. Am	USA	1932	2001
Foley, John Patrick	Grand Master of the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulcre in Jerusalem	N. Am	USA	1935	2007
George, Francis	Archbishop of Chicago	N. Am	USA	1937	1998
Keeler, William Henry	Archbishop Emeritus of Baltimore	N. Am	USA	1931	1994
Law, Bernard	Archbishop Emeritus of Boston	N. Am	USA	1931	1985
Levada, William	Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith	N. Am	USA	1936	2006
Mahony, Roger	Archbishop of Los Angeles	N. Am	USA	1936	1991
Maida, Adam Joseph	Archbishop of Detroit	N. Am	USA	1930	1994
McCarrick, Theodore "Ted"	Archbishop Emeritus of Washington	N. Am	USA	1930	2001
O'Malley, Sean Patrick	Archbishop of Boston	N. Am	USA	1944	2006
Rigali, Justin	Archbishop of Philadelphia	N. Am	USA	1935	2003
Stafford, James Francis	Major Penitentiary of the Apostolic Penitentiary	N. Am	USA	1932	1998
Schönborn, Christoph	Archbishop of Vienna	W. Eur	Austria	1945	1998
Daneels, Godfried	Archbishop of Mechelen-Brussel	W. Eur	Belgium	1933	1983
Cordes, Paul Jozef	President of <i>Cor Unum</i>	W. Eur	Germany	1934	2007
Kasper, Walter	Pont. Council for Promotion of Christian Unity	W. Eur	Germany	1933	2001
Lehmann, Karl	Bishop of Mainz,	W. Eur	Germany	1936	2001
Meisner, Joachim	Archbishop of Cologne	W. Eur	Germany	1933	1983
Sterzinsky, Georg Mzimillian	Archbishop of Berlin	W. Eur	Germany	1936	1991
Wetter, Friedrich	Archbishop Emeritus of Munich and Freising	W. Eur	Germany	1928	1985
Simonis, Adrianus	Archbishop Emeritus of Utrecht	W. Eur	Netherlands	1931	1985

Eliminated due to "Reform Party" ideology

Name	Position	Region	Nation	Born	Cardinal Since
Daneels, Godfried	Archbishop of Mechelen-Brussel	W. Eur	Belgium	1933	1983
Kasper, Walter	Pont. Council for Promotion of Christian Unity	W. Eur	Germany	1933	2001
Lehmann, Karl	Bishop of Mainz,	W. Eur	Germany	1936	2001
Mahony, Roger	Archbishop of Los Angeles	N. Am	USA	1936	1991
McCarrick, Theodore "Ted"	Archbishop Emeritus of Washington	N. Am	USA	1930	2001
Murphy-O'Connor, Cormac	Archbishop of Westminster	W. Eur	UK (Eng.)	1932	2001
Napier, Wilfrid Fox	Archbishop of Durban	Africa	S. Africa	1941	2001
O'Brien, Keith Michael Patrick	Archbishop of St. Andrews and Edinburgh	W. Eur	UK (Scot.)	1938	2003